Against a backdrop of ongoing wars, rising trade tensions, mounting debt burdens, and heightened global uncertainty, the 2026 International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Spring Meetings and Financing for Development (FfD) forum reflected an increasingly familiar scenario for the Global South: a system that was not designed for it and does not work for it.
The Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) cannot claim universal legitimacy while disproportionately reflecting the hegemonic priorities of the most powerful states. This sentiment is echoed by President Ramaphosa’s recent call for reform at the Progressive Summit in Spain: “This is a time of aggression, war, conflict, and destruction. The laws and norms that have long defined relations between nations are wilfully violated. Institutions of global governance are being undermined or maliciously repurposed … We must reform the financial architecture and close the financing gap for development.”
A modest first step
One of the key advances made at the IMF and World Bank Springs Meetings was the launch of UNCTAD’s Borrowers’ Platform. The Borrowers’ Platform aims to provide developing countries with a space to share experiences, learn from each other, and engage more effectively in global debt discussions. This follows the Fourth Financing for Development Conference 2025 Sevilla Commitment in Paragraph 48 (i), which calls for “establishing a platform for borrower countries to…strengthen their voices in the global debt architecture”. By providing a space for Borrower countries to develop a voice, the Platform is a modest first step towards an international financial architecture that serves the interests of development over the interests of rich countries and private creditors.
Rising financing demands under crisis
Even as reforms stall and the cost of borrowing increases, demand for IMF support continues to grow. More than 12 countries are expected to apply for emergency financing following surging energy prices and supply chain disruptions, as a result of the illegal war on Iran by the United States and Israel in the Middle East.
The human cost of this conflict is immense, with widespread suffering and destabilisation across the region and beyond. The World Food Programme (WFP) estimates an additional 45 million people could fall into acute hunger by mid-2026 if the conflict persists and oil prices stay above $100 a barrel.
The ongoing conflict also presents a high risk to Africa in particular, with a projected loss of 0.2% in output growth on Africa’s GDP expected if the conflict exceeds a duration of 6 months. This also follows historic declines in Official Development Assistance (ODA), with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reporting a 23% decline in ODA in 2025 alone. This risks exacerbating debt distress and development spending cuts, with bilateral ODA to least developed countries (LDCs) and sub-Saharan Africa falling in 2025 by 26%. In response to the unprecedented decline in aid commitments and rises in military spending, developing country blocs such as the Group of 24 have called for more targeted responses to support vulnerable countries, including the sale of IMF gold and the reallocation of Special Drawing Rights.
A growing disconnect between crisis and response
The Spring Meetings reflected the growing disconnect between the IMF narrative and the causes of the current crises. Ongoing conflicts and instability are framed in narrow financial terms, such as risks, spreads, and market volatility, without acknowledging their links to geopolitics, inequality, the erosion of international law, and wars of aggression by global powers.
The IMF and World Bank have expressed concern over the deepening global economic crisis. However, the policy direction from the Springs reflected a continued emphasis on fiscal restraint, through the promotion of deregulation and private sector-led growth. While measures that could provide countries with immediate support, such as the suspension of debt payments or the elimination of IMF surcharges on countries with high levels of debt, like Pakistan and Egypt, were notably absent.
Concerns over institutional credibility were reinforced by the World Bank’s continued association with neo-colonial initiatives such as the Board of Peace, alongside growing research that points to the negative impacts of IMF programmes on growth, inequality, and poverty.
Policy direction at odds with development realities
As the largest shareholder in BWIs, the United States is shaping the agenda of the BWIs by reducing the focus on gender and climate priorities and blocking progress of SDRs and debt relief. Persistent inequities about how IMF resources are created and distributed remain unaddressed.
The disbursement of Special Drawing Rights continues to be lopsided, with countries that need them most receiving the least, while rich developed countries receive the lion’s share without using them. Moreover, the IMF could pull Africa out of debt distress by selling its abundant gold reserves, given the record-high prices of gold at above $4,000 per ounce. A small fraction of its 90.5 million ounces of gold reserves could comfortably cover multilateral development banks’ portion of restructuring costs without harming the fund’s balance sheet. This policy option, however, remains blocked because it requires US Congressional approval, which IMF staff consider completely off the table during the current administration.
Urgent reform needed but unlikely
Despite mounting pressure, the likelihood of meaningful reform remains slim. The 2026 Diriyah Guiding Principles on IMF Quota and Governance Reforms are intended to guide future discussions on institutional reform. However, the IMF is unlikely to pursue quota changes under the Diriyah Principles that would rebalance voting power.
At the Springs, no agreement was reached on vote share realignment, and no meaningful steps were taken to strengthen the voice of Global South countries. The World Bank failed to compel countries to commit and follow through on the call by the Independent Expert Group’s (IEG) from India’s G20 in 2023 to triple MDB commitments between 2020 and 2030.
The recent replenishment outcomes of the World Bank’s lending arm to low-income countries – International Development Association (IDA) – further highlight the gap between stated ambition and actual financial commitments. The IDA21 $100 billion replenishment represents a decline in real terms compared to the IDA20 replenishment, with donor contributions only marginally higher in nominal terms. The upcoming IDA22 replenishment would need to be at least $278 billion to achieve the IEG’s goal of reaching three times the $93 billion financing package provided under IDA20. The absence of additional commitments or concrete timelines risks the symbolic gestures of confronting the development rather than substantive developmental capital.
These constraints are not merely technical; they reflect paralysis in global economic governance that results in these institutions being unable to fulfil their commitments to foster global economic stability and support sustainable development.
Declining solidarity and deepening divisions
The Spring Meetings also witnessed the unprecedented exclusion of South Africa from the G20 Finance Ministers meetings by the United States. This exclusion underscores how easily global governance norms and spaces are being reshaped to deliberately exclude countries based on hegemonic countries’ geopolitical agendas, highlighting the importance of more accountable, democratic multilateral decision-making. Equally revealing was the response of silence by other G20 members. There was no coordinated pushback or meaningful resistance. The glaring absence of solidarity reflects a system in which power, not principle, continues to determine the participation of developing countries.
Broader tensions in economic governance were also evident at the FfD forum in the UN in New York. Disagreements persisted over how to frame the current geopolitical moment, particularly in relation to conflicts in the Middle East. On financing, the European Union (EU) continues to resist the establishment of a UN Convention on Tax, preferring rule-making to remain within the OECD’s two-pillar framework, which was negotiated undemocratically and transparently by high-income countries. The EU has also pushed back against provisions to establish an intergovernmental process on debt as per paragraph 50f of Compromiso de Seville, reflecting continued resistance by the Global North to more democratic governance of the global debt architecture.
Despite hopes that the Forum would push the Financing for Development agenda beyond broad political commitments, the final outcome remained limited in ambition. The 2026 FfD Adopted Outcome largely restates the Compromiso de Sevilla, without meaningfully advancing its implementation. The persistence of the SDG financing gap, estimated at over US$4 trillion annually, further underscores the disconnect between the scale of global challenges and the limited ambition of existing reform efforts.
The 2026 Financing Sustainable Development Report, released ahead of the Forum, painted an equally concerning picture, finding stagnated progress in several key areas of development finance, and worsening trajectories in others.
The future of multilateralism
As the United Nations Secretary-General said at the opening of the FfD Forum, “The global financial system is struggling to meet the needs of developing countries and still reflects the economic and power structures of the past”. The outcomes of the 2026 Spring Meetings and FfD Forum reflect a widening gap between the scale of global challenges and the ambition of institutional responses.
An international financial architecture that fails to represent and respond to the needs of the Global South risks losing not only its legitimacy but also its relevance. If reform continues to stall, the future of global economic governance may not lie in transforming existing institutions, but rather in states building alternatives beyond them.
