



Revised Fiscal Framework and Revenue Proposals

26 October 2026

Attention: Allan Wicomb, Nkululeko Mangweni, and Lwazikazi Ntinzi

Finance Standing Committee:

Chairperson: Mr MJ Maswanganyi (ANC)

Members: Alexander, Ms W (DA), Bateman, Mr Bateman, Mr AG (DA), Beesley, Mr AD (Action SA), Gcaleka-Mazibuko, Ms NA (ANC), Hadebe, Mr N (IFP) Lekganyane, Mr MS (ANC) Makhubela, Ms LS (ANC), Maotwe, Ms OMC (EFF), Sekoati, Mr SC (ANC), and Van Rooyen, Mr DD (MK).

Select Committee on Finance:

Chairperson: Ms Ndhlovu, S (Chairperson),

Members: Mr Britz, J.H.P, Ms Legwase, T.I., Mr Majola, J.S., Ms Nxumalo, S., Mr Radebe, B.A., Mr Ryder, D.R., Ms Siwisa, A.M., and Mr Swart, P.J.

Dear Members of the Select and Standing Committees on Finance and Committee Secretaries,

On behalf of the Universal Basic Income Coalition (UBIC), thank you for the opportunity to make the following written submission and participate in the public hearings on 28 October 2026 in response to the Revised Fiscal Framework and Revenue Proposals tabled by the Minister of Finance on 21 October 2026.

Given the centrality afforded to public participation in our constitutional democracy, we trust that you will give meaningful consideration to our submission and the considered and substantiated proposals.

Should you have any questions regarding this submission, please feel free to contact UBIC at Siyanda Baduza at siyanda.baduza@iej.org.za.

1. Executive summary

UBIC's submission to the Finance Committees on the 2026 Revised Fiscal Framework and MTBPS concerns social grants. The MTBPS cuts grants by R13 billion over the medium term, about half from the SRD grant and half from the Child Support, Older Person's and Disability grants.

The “fraud” claim: Treasury attributes the savings to fraud reduction, but government data shows otherwise. The SRD cut reflects an underspend caused by over a million approved beneficiaries going unpaid (R3.1bn unspent in 2025/26). The cut to the longer-standing grants reflects cancellations when people couldn't navigate SASSA's review process.

Exclusion, not fraud: The SRD's online-only biometric (eKYC) verification excludes people without smartphones, stable internet or the original phone number. 95% of cancellations in the long-standing grants are due to barriers to undergoing reviews, not failed means tests. None of the review cancellations appear in SASSA's fraud reporting.

Trade-off with GBV and stunting: We support more funding for these programmes but reject redirecting grant “savings” to them. All spending is funded out of the same budget envelope—so it is nonsensical to say that grant cuts are specifically being used to fund these programmes. Moreover, cash transfers reduce women's vulnerability to partner violence and are central to child nutrition, so the cuts will likely do more harm than the R7.2 billion allocated will help.

Budgeting of the SRD: The grant is funded one year at a time under contingencies rather than in the main budget, which distorts spending totals even though the successor grant won't be legislated until 2029/30 at the earliest. At R370 it is well below the food poverty line (R868), has fallen behind inflation, and has a R624 means test that creates a poverty trap.

Transparency gaps: SASSA has stopped consistently reporting on SRD applications, approvals and payments. Treasury's projected savings of over R6 billion on the older grants is about 30 times the previous year's claimed R201 million, with no evidence of how it was derived.

Key recommendations to Parliament:

- Fund the SRD in the main budget until its successor is in place
- Cost and disclose the planned SRD improvements
- Investigate the SRD underspend and the TARS savings claims, including through human rights impact assessments
- Restore regular SASSA statistical reporting
- Revisit the SRD's value and means test

- Stop reporting review non-attendance and verification failures as fraud savings

2. Introduction

This submission is narrowly focused on social protection. The Committees have previously received submissions on the SRD grant, together with recommendations calling for greater transparency and clarity on the grant and the budget decisions surrounding it. Social grants are consequential in budgetary terms. They account for one of the largest allocations of any function. Spending on social protection accounts for around 12% of consolidated government expenditure and around 4% of GDP. These budget allocations are also extremely consequential for the population, for access to basic needs and for rights realisation. Half of all South African households receive at least one grant, and for a quarter of households, grants are the main source of income¹. Social grants are extremely important for maintaining living standards in the context of increasing inflation, worsening unemployment and a poverty rate that [now stands at 67%](#).

The budget process, including the MTBPS is meant to provide a clear update on the fiscal framework and government's spending priorities, and to show whether budget adjustments translate into improved implementation and measurable outcomes for citizens. Instead, in the case of social grants, as our submission shows, the budget is being used to obscure rather than inform, going against basic principles of transparency, accountability and fairness.

The MTBPS cuts social grants by R13 billion over the medium term. Approximately half of these cuts come from the SRD grant and half from the long-standing grants: The Child Support Grant (CSG), the Older Person's Grant (OPG) and the Disability Grant (DG). The MTBPS explicitly attributes this to a reduction in fraud. We submit that this is a gross misrepresentation—and that government data clearly shows that the cuts are the result of (1) an underspend on the SRD grant due to a failure to pay over a million qualifying and approved grant holders, and (2) cancellations of CSG, OPG, DG and other grants due to people being unable to access SASSA's grant review process. *These grant cancellations do not constitute fraud, and there is no evidence that the vast majority of persons who have lost access to their grants are guilty of fraud.*

UBIC is not opposed to safeguarding the grant system against fraud. Fraud redirects funds away from the system, and we care deeply about the provision of this critical service to everyone who needs it. But anti-fraud efforts must be justified, evidence-based, proportionate and fair. This is not the case. Instead, a narrative of 'fraud' is being used to justify and render palatable what actually amounts to (potentially erroneous) exclusion from social assistance. This must be challenged and rejected by parliament.

We also strongly object to the notion that social assistance funds can or should be redirected to programmes intended to mitigate gender-based violence (GBV) and child stunting. [Statements](#) made by National Treasury leaders on the MTBPS seek to present funding for gender-based

¹ General Household Survey 2025

violence (GBV) provisions and the response to child stunting as a trade-off against grants—explicitly stating that “savings” derived from the cancellation of social grants are being redirected to GBV and stunting initiatives. Anti-GBV and stunting programmes are much needed and deserve much greater funding, and UBIC supports mobilising more resources in these areas. However, the reality is that more people will be at risk of GBV and malnutrition as a direct result of the cuts to social grants. [Research overwhelmingly shows](#) that cash assistance improves women’s economic independence, rendering them less vulnerable to partner violence. It increases their ability to leave abusive situations. The child support grant has been demonstrated time and again to protect children from the worst impacts of poverty, and is the single most important intervention for improving child nutrition outcomes. Reducing access to the child support grant will likely hurt vulnerable women and children, more than the total of R7.2 billion allocated to GBV and stunting programmes will help them.

The tax revenue forecast has been lifted in the MTBPS by R17 billion. The primary budget surplus reaches R140 billion this year. We have enormous [untaxed wealth](#) and resources in this country. We are a wealthy country by international standards, but an extreme outlier in terms of our poverty headcount. There is no need whatsoever to trade social grants off against support for GBV victims and mitigation of child stunting. The resources are available to fund all of these priorities. Government has a moral and constitutional imperative to do so.

3. Extension of the SRD grant

For years, the SRD grant has been budgeted for in a piecemeal fashion. It is extended for a year, set to expire in March of the following year, and then renewed in the MTBPS for only one more year. The justification given is that the grant is temporary. In practice, it is temporary only in rhetoric, a rhetoric that allows for continued differential treatment of the SRD relative to other grants, including online-only applications, restricted appeals and income verification.

The decision to terminate the grant, which has long been held over grant holders, does not lie with Treasury. It falls under the policy mandate of the Department of Social Development (DSD). DSD has [made it explicit](#) that the grant will not be terminated but will be the basis for its next iteration, the form of which is still not clear. According to DSD’s [submissions](#) to the Social Development Portfolio Committee, the legislative process to transition the SRD grant into a more permanent grant will only conclude by 2029/30 at the earliest. In light of this, National Treasury must fund the SRD up until the date at which it will be replaced, rather than providing ad hoc extensions.

The budget implication is that the cost of the grant is not carried in the medium-term framework under the relevant functions, but sits outside the main budget under contingencies. The result is misleading totals for social sector spending and for overall non-interest expenditure over the medium term. Whether or not it is intentional, it is misleading in effect. Successive budgets show drastic drop-offs in the outer years that are then readjusted upwards, producing an inaccurate trajectory for grant spending and overall spending in budget as Table 1 demonstrates.

Table: Variation between successive budgets over the extended EF


Revised estimates /Medium-term estimates	2023/34	2024/25	2025/26	2026/27	2027/28	2028/29	Source
Social Grants							
	250 967	266 210	248 408	259 788			2024 Budget
		266 791	284 751	259 663	271 405		2025 Budget
			280 884	292 771	268 893	277 769	2026 Budget
Social Relief of Distress							
	33 893	33 693	424	443			2024 Budget
		35 509	35 293	443	463		2025 Budget
			34 292	36 889	1 720	1 262	2026 Budget

Source: National Treasury Budget Reviews and Estimates of National Expenditure.

This is not only poor budgeting practice but it also keeps beneficiaries who depend on the grant anxious, and it has been used to claim year after year that the grant is "temporary" and "not funded". That claim is untrue. The social grant budget is not ring-fenced, the overall cost sits within the budget framework in any event.

The piecemeal treatment also makes it difficult for policy to be interrogated, in particular on the value of the grant. As has been well canvassed, the value of the SRD grant has fallen significantly behind inflation since it was introduced. The North Gauteng High Court has ruled that this is a retrogression of the right to social assistance. Yet, we still see that government failed to take into account evidence of the cost of basic needs (as indicated by the national poverty lines) as well as evidence of scale of need and rate of eligibility within the population, when providing budget allocations for the SRD grant. At R370, with only a single meagre increase of R20 since 2020, the value of the grant has fallen sharply in real terms relative to every other grant (see Figure 1). It is no longer tied to any objective determination of need, that is, what it is supposed to cover.

SRD grant: Nominal vs Real (2020 prices)



Author's own calculations

The 2026 MTBPS continues this pattern, with the announcement that the grant is renewed until March 2028, with no clarity on its future or the future values of the grant despite the policy process on its replacement expected to conclude in March 2030.

4. Proposed improvements to the grant

The stated position is that work is under way to improve and transform the grant to connect beneficiaries with training and job opportunities. Yet, this is happening while the grant is being adjusted downwards over the next two years: the allocation is reduced by R2.8 billion in 2027/28 and R3.6 billion in 2028/29. If improvements are planned, they should be costed, disclosed, and reflected in the medium-term framework. Without this, Parliament is analysing the budget under unrealistic conditions. The expansion of a function cannot be accompanied by systematic cuts in resources.

The value and means-test threshold of the grant must also be revisited and justified by evidence. The regulations restrict the grant to individuals with income below R624 per month, whether from employment or from financial support. But National Treasury appears not to have taken into account any evidence or research on the cost of meeting basic needs, in determining these thresholds. The cost of work-seeking alone illustrates the problem. [Research](#) by Youth Capital estimates the cost of searching for work at R1 469 per month, made up of transport (R700), data (R441) and applications (R328). For unemployed young people, income support

and employment policy cannot be treated as separate policy concerns. The costs of searching for work are often incurred long before a young person receives their first salary. Transport to interviews, mobile data, applications and other recruitment-related expenses can determine whether an individual is able to pursue an opportunity at all. In this context, the SRD grant does not necessarily replace income from employment; it can help finance the search for employment. This is particularly important in a labour market where opportunities are scarce, recruitment processes can be prolonged, and young people are frequently expected to absorb the costs of accessing work without any guarantee of employment. The inadequacy of the grant must therefore be assessed not only against basic consumption needs, but also against the costs unemployed people face when attempting to participate in the economy. Moreover, the food poverty line (the cost of meeting an individual's basic caloric intake requirements) stands at R868. R370 is clearly insufficient to allow a person to survive, let alone improve their livelihood and employment prospects.

A low means-test institutionalises an extreme poverty trap and discourages work-seeking and entrepreneurship, because as soon as someone earns any income they lose support. This is incongruous with the notion of linking the grant to jobs and livelihoods. The design of income support should recognise that transitions into employment are rarely immediate or linear. Young people may move between unemployment, temporary work, informal income-generating activities and periods of further training before securing sustainable livelihoods. A social protection system that withdraws support too quickly when someone begins earning a modest or irregular income risks undermining the very economic participation government seeks to encourage.

UBIC therefore recommends that the design of the SRD's successor explicitly accommodates irregular and transitional earnings, with appropriate income disregards or gradual withdrawal mechanisms that allow young people to pursue employment and self-employment without immediately losing their income security.

5. Source of “savings”: the SRD grant

The Minister's speech attributes the R13 billion in grant savings to the targeted and responsible savings (TARS) initiative which has sought to make changes to how income eligibility for grants is verified. The fine print shows that only about half is attributable to changes to income verification on the longer-standing grants. The other half comes from the SRD, which is treated separately. The downward adjustments to the SRD are R2.77 billion in 2027/28 and R3.57 billion in 2028/29, about R6.3 billion over two years.

These reductions cannot be due to income verification simply because income verification has been part of the SRD since 2022. [Research](#), media reports and the [High Court](#) have all found it to rely on inaccurate methods (which we do not litigate here but point to show that the methods are flawed). The savings are instead mainly attributable to the eKYC verification method rolled out for the SRD in 2025. This is a form of biometric verification, similar to the selfie check a person would complete with a bank before making a large transfer. After their applications are

approved, beneficiaries may be required, repeatedly, to complete this biometric identification. It requires a camera-enabled smartphone, stable internet access, a smart ID card, and access to the same phone number used to apply, possibly as far back as 2022. General Household Survey data show that many of the poorest South Africans are not in a position to meet these requirements. Ordinarily, a person could walk into an office to verify their identity. In the SRD, this is not possible, because the system is exclusively online. Consequently, upwards of one million applicants who have been demonstrated to meet the eligibility criteria are unable to complete this new verification step.


The result is high rates of non-payment of approved beneficiaries (see Table 2 below and Figure 2). This was the source of the underspending on the SRD in the last financial year, with R3.1 billion unspent in 2025/26, following R2.6 billion in 2024/25. Instead of investigating the cause or improving access to verification, even through something as simple as allowing people to verify at an office, these 'savings' are returned to the fiscus and credited to fraud reduction. That is not accurate. Responsible savings should come from eliminating inefficiencies, not from illegitimate exclusions.

Table 2: Approval and payments for months in which data is available.

	Approvals	Payments	% of approved beneficiaries paid	Number of unpaid approved beneficiaries
December 2024	9,072,010	7,006,332	77%	2,065,678
January 2025	8,612,735	6,719,001	78%	1,893,734
February 2025	8,720,595	6,762,696	78%	1,957,899
March 2025	9,259,405	7,089,921	77%	2,169,484
June 2025	9,419,293	7,192,230	76%	2,227,063
September 2025	7,848,499	7,043,578	89.74%	804,921
December 2025	7,749,971	7,044,933	90.90%	705,038
June 2026	7,874,712	6,998,206	88.87%	876,506

Source: SASSA Statistical Reports

Figure 2: The gap between SRD approvals and Payments



This is both an administrative and a budgetary issue. It is easy to imagine a scenario in which verification is fixed, people receive their entitlements, and the R6 billion to R7 billion on which the GBV response has been predicated disappears, leaving yet another implemented programme underfunded.

Treasury named its efficiency programme TARS to emphasise targeted and responsible savings, specifically to distinguish it from the reckless cuts of the DOGE programme in the United States, which cut things like cancer research. That intention is admirable, but it requires a level of nuance and detail to ensure that cuts really are inefficiencies. In the case of the SRD they are not. They are being driven by unfair exclusions of the most vulnerable.

Efforts to strengthen the relationship between social protection and employment must also be matched by investment in the opportunities to which beneficiaries are expected to transition. Linking SRD recipients to employment platforms or training services is insufficient if there are too few funded opportunities available. Public employment programmes have an important complementary role to play by providing access to income, work experience and community-based employment opportunities, particularly for young people facing significant barriers to entering the formal labour market. They should not be positioned as substitutes for social protection, nor should access to the SRD be made contingent on participation in these programmes.

UBIC therefore calls for a coordinated approach in which adequate income support, accessible employment services, skills development and predictable, multi-year funding for public employment programmes form part of a broader response to structural unemployment.

6. Lack of reporting on payments by SASSA

There is also an alarming lack of data reporting on this issue. SASSA has not reported consistently on SRD grant applications, approvals and payments, nor on social grant reviews. Statistical reports are missing from its website, and where available they do not break down applications, approvals and payments. UBIC has tried to engage repeatedly with SASSA over a number of months to access the missing statistical reports as well as SRD payment data, to no avail. In presentations and parliamentary questions, SASSA now refers only to 'processed applications' or applications and approvals. Payments matter now more than ever and should be clearly reported.

For most of 2024 and 2025, between 1.9 and 2.2 million approved beneficiaries went unpaid every month. The scant data that is available now shows between 0.7 and 0.9 million, but the number of approvals has also fallen by well over a million. Without a consistent series, there is no way to tell how many people are being excluded. Data transparency matters for democracy, and especially for a programme on which we spend over R35 billion annually.

7. Source of “savings”: the longer-standing grants


The second R6 billion of the R13 billion in cuts comes from the longer-standing grants, ostensibly from curbing fraud. The downward adjustments are R2.87 billion in 2027/28 and R3.89 billion in 2028/29. This will reduce the number of longer-standing grant beneficiaries from 18.6 million at the end of June 2026 to 17.1 million by 2029/30. It marks the first time beneficiary numbers fall, and they fall below all projections and estimates, despite rising cost of living, unemployment and poverty.

The decline is largely the result of an intensified grant review campaign, driven by conditions that Treasury placed on SASSA's operating budget, which extend SRD-style verification to the other grants. The Social Assistance Regulations already required ongoing monitoring and verification. Treasury's conditions did not introduce verification. They introduced new methods, which they made mandatory across all applicants and grant holders, and dramatically increased the scale of reviews.

We have covered at length why bank and database verification are inappropriate, i.e. they cannot reliably show a person's income position. Moreover, SASSA does not have the capacity to conduct reviews at the rate Treasury is mandating, given chronic understaffing and falling budgets. This has resulted in chaos and hardship on the group. Figure 3 shows just a sample of the reporting on this issue. SASSA's messaging campaign has not reached many people. Payments are delayed or suspended without people understanding what that means. Getting to an office costs money. People face extremely long queues, wait all day and are not served, and are not told why they were flagged, so they must effectively prove a negative, often over multiple trips. Reviews involving children's grants also require biometric verification of all children over 3 years of age which means children are also queuing with their caregivers for long periods of time, often in their school uniforms, clearly missing school. Caregivers also have to pay the

transport costs to bring children with to the reviews. The system has been in crisis, leading the [minister to apologise](#) to pensioners and people who have had to sleep outside in queues, which is a clear violation of the dignity of some of the most vulnerable people in the country.

Figure 3: Selected media reporting on the chaos of grant reviews




The result has been thousands of cancelled grants, with over a million more cancellations projected. Without this context, it might look like SASSA and Treasury are weeding out fraudulent beneficiaries. The data tell a different story Figure 4 shows that the vast majority of cancellations to date were of people who were unable to complete their reviews. SASSA's review data show no spike in failed means-tests, only in increased barriers to undergoing review, and the context outlined above shows that those who are unable to complete their reviews are not random but driven by administrative barriers. 95% of grant cancellations were

due to “failure to review”—not proven fraud. These do not constitute fraudulent grants—but arbitrary exclusions.

Failure to review includes people who did not receive notice therefore did not know they were under review, those who did get notice but failed to present, those who did present and were halfway through the review when national automatically suspended them because the local office has not yet finalised the review or loaded their biometrics, or the biometric loading had failed due to it being a new system with glitches. It also includes people who were requested to produce a document that they could not obtain from another department because the other department does not provide such a document or has long queues to access the document. SASSA should be requested to provide a breakdown of all the sub-categories within the failure to review category to illustrate this point and counter the narrative that all these suspensions are due to fraud.

Figure 4



Source: SASSA Monthly Statistical Reports

The Finance Minister stated that these savings come from stamping out fraud. Fraud has a clear legal definition and a clear process when suspected. SASSA has a dedicated division that investigates incidents and reports them to law enforcement. The latest [SASSA annual report](#) shows that almost 200 000 grants were cancelled but none of these were reported as “fraud” in the relevant section of the report.

There is also a question of credibility. Treasury now projects over R6 billion in savings over the next two years on these grants, while the 2026 Budget Review claimed savings of R201 million from 2025/26. This is a 30-fold increase, provided with no evidence of how the figure was derived.

8. Inclusion of the SRD in the risk assessment

Treasury lists the SRD court case as a risk to the fiscal position and sustainability. It notes, correctly, that a Supreme Court of Appeal judgment upholding the High Court ruling, even partially, would significantly increase the number of beneficiaries if the barriers the High Court found unlawful and unconstitutional are lifted. Treasury suggests the cost could double. The High Court directed the Minister of Social Development to deliver a plan to the parties and the Court within four months and to implement it without delay.

This is identified as a significant risk, yet no contingency has been presented, only an apparent hope that the judgment will be overturned. To avoid chaos if the outcome goes against government, Treasury and DSD should be required to provide a detailed contingency plan. Parliament should know how many people are currently excluded by each regulation under challenge, what the modelling says, how a worst-case scenario would be resourced, and how much would be needed to comply with the judgment. Parliament should also know whether Treasury has discussed implementation with SASSA and DSD, whether a judgment would affect the design of the next version of the grant, and whether this is already included in the costing.

9. Conclusion and recommendations

The starting point of the current approach is Rand savings, not rights, needs, or structural transformation. Cuts are being made to programmes on which vulnerable people depend for their survival, and presented as savings.

While GBV resourcing is welcome, reallocating funds from social assistance to GBV is counterproductive. Similarly, one cannot credibly say that child stunting is a priority while cutting the grants that over half of the country's children receive, and that [demonstrably reduce](#) malnutrition, in favour of an intervention with the same purpose and a different mechanism. More detail is needed on the R1.6 billion allocated here. If history is a guide, it will take the form of food parcels, which are less efficient and more prone to corruption than cash transfers.

The National Development Plan sets a target of zero poverty by 2030, measured against the lower-bound poverty line (LBPL), with LBPL poverty at 37.9%. The current medium-term framework runs to 2030 and is the main tool that the country is using to get there. As it stands, the budget is disconnected from the real economy issues of poverty, inequality and unemployment. Cutting social grants is one example.

In summary we make the following recommendations:

- In future budgets, the SRD grant should be reflected in the main budget under the social development function, not under contingencies, for the full medium term until the transition to a successor grant, which the policy process expects in 2029/30.
- The details and costing of the proposed extension of the SRD (training and job linkages) should be provided and reflected in the medium-term framework.
- The chronic underspending on the SRD (R2.6 billion in 2024/25 and R3.1 billion in 2025/26) should be investigated, including the share attributable to biometric verification difficulties.
- SASSA should revert back to reporting regularly on the SRD grant numbers, including payments as payments are what most accurately reflects expenditure.
- The value and means-test thresholds of the SRD should be revisited. They should be informed by evidence of need balanced together with the fiscal position, not just the fiscal position.
- The savings attributed to TARS on the longer-standing grants should be investigated, including how the projected R6.8 billion was derived, cancellations by reason (including a breakdown of the failure to review category), and the number of beneficiaries removed for failing to attend reviews, and impacts on human rights.
- A detailed contingency plan and costing should be provided for a judgment similar to the High Court's. It should include the number of people currently excluded by each challenged regulation, the modelling and resourcing for the worst case, and the implications for the design of the next version of the grant.
- Savings from review non-attendance and verification failures should no longer be reported as savings from fraud. Actual fraud prosecutions should be reported separately in the Budget.
- Any proposed linkages between the SRD grant and employment, training or entrepreneurship opportunities should be voluntary, adequately resourced and accompanied by clear implementation and accountability frameworks. Access to income support should not be made conditional on participation in employment-related activities.
- The design of the SRD's successor should recognise the costs of looking for work, and meeting basic needs and the realities of irregular and transitional earnings. Income thresholds and withdrawal mechanisms should be structured to support, rather than penalise, transitions into employment and self-employment.
- National Treasury and the relevant departments should demonstrate how proposed improvements to the SRD will be complemented by investment in accessible employment services, skills development and public employment opportunities, with clear responsibilities, funding commitments and measurable outcomes.

UBIC is comprised of the following organisations:

- Alternative Information and Development Centre (AIDC)
- Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN) – Africa UBI Observatory
- Black Sash
- Children's Institute, UCT
- Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)

- Environmental Monitoring Group
- Global Reformed Platforms for Engagement (GRAPE)
- Grandmothers Against Poverty and Aids (GAPA)
- Institute for Economic Justice (IEJ)
- National Education, Health and Allied Workers' Union (NEHAWU)
- #PayTheGrants
- South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU)
- The Family Caregiving Programme (UCT)
- Women on Farms Project
- Youth Capital